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Why do established practices deinstitutionalize? An actor-centered approach 
 
Abstract: Drawing on 63 in-depth interviews from three American multinationals, we investigate 
how individual actors negotiate the interplay of insider and outsider pressures on the 
deinstitutionalization of four employment practices in an institutionally complex setting. Existing 
institutional theory highlights different degrees of deinstitutionalization, from complete 
abandonment of practices to partial erosion, with an underlying presumption of organizations 
and actors striving for stability and stasis. However, our study finds that actor reconciliation of 
interacting insider and outsider pressures can result in three distinct phases of 
deinstitutionalization (complete, partial, and negotiated deinstitutionalization) which crucially 
coexist, suggesting perpetual instability and change. We conceptualize the individual-level 
enabling conditions for each of these different phases of deinstitutionalization, highlighting a 
range of actor responses as well as differences in how they exercise agency across each phase. 
Examining actor negotiation of the interplay of insider and outsider pressures improves our 
understanding of how individuals engage in differential institutional work when responding to 
practice deinstitutionalization. 
 
Keywords: deinstitutionalization, institutional work, agency, institutional complexity, 
multinationals, Global South  
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Introduction 
Deinstitutionalization remains an empirically under-researched area within institutional theory, 
despite it being highlighted many times for its potential theoretical and empirical importance 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Zilber, 2002; Oliver, 1992). Deinstitutionalization refers to the 
weakening and erosion of organizational practices and activities because of waning 
organizational consensus around them, eventually leading to their abandonment and 
disappearance (Scott, 2001; Oliver, 1992). Entrenched practices are discontinued not because 
better alternatives have emerged but because political, social and functional pressures from both 
within and outside the organization have robbed them of their legitimacy and meaning (Maguire 
& Hardy, 2009; Oliver, 1992). Existing literature has treated deinstitutionalization as either 
insider-driven i.e. organizational actors and endogenous forces initiating change (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993) or outsider-driven in response to external 
pressures such as a changing regulatory environment, economic crises (Ahmadijian & Robinson, 
2001; Stark, 1996), major political upheavals (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein, 1988) or even 
disruptive external actors such as the media, independent researchers and specialist agencies 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  
 
This paper extends current work on deinstitutionalization by moving beyond this dichotomic 
consideration of either insider or outsider pressures and examining the under-considered 
interplay of both these pressures (Clemente & Roulet, 2015).  Burgeoning institutional 
scholarship is increasingly emphasizing how micro-level processes initiated by local actors can 
affect both institutional change and institutional maintenance (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; 
Dacin, Munir & Tracey, 2010). Therefore, we specifically focus on how individual actors make 
sense of, and influence, this interplay between the ‘macrophenomena’ of insider and outsider 
pressures on the deinstitutionalization process (Clement & Roulet, 2015: 100). Literature on 
agency and micro-phenomena has also been criticized for focusing more on an outside-in 
approach of ‘how institutional forces dictate individual behaviour’ while underplaying how 
‘micro-level activities affect the nature of these forces’ (McPherson & Sauder, 2013: 166). We 
focus on the latter by empirically exploring how actors understand and react to multiple 
pressures, the potential heterogeneity of these micro-level responses, and most importantly the 
subsequent implications for deinstitutionalization itself.  
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Furthermore, we study these actor responses in a context of high institutional complexity 
signifying multiple and often conflicting institutional demands (Pache & Santos, 2010; 
Greenwood et al, 2011). Lok (2010) has highlighted our limited understanding of actor responses 
and decision-making processes in multi- institutional environments specifically, even though 
extant work has argued that institutional heterogeneity is likely to facilitate agency by 
stimulating actor reflexivity (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009). To this 
end, we explore micro-level processes in three American MNC subsidiaries in a developing 
country – an organizational and environmental context situated ‘at the intersection of multiple 
institutional fields’ each with its own distinctive set of expectations, cultural codes and logics 
(McPherson & Sauder, 2013: 166). In this context, individual actors need to navigate and 
reconcile not only multiple insider effects of corporate, home and host country influences 
(Edwards et al, 2015; Ferner, Quintanilla & Varul, 2001) but also multiple outsider pressures 
because of contradictory normative and cognitive prescriptions sometimes coexisting in a rapidly 
changing society typical of many developing and emerging economies (Boisot & Child, 1996).  
 
We study the interplay of deinstitutionalization pressures by considering the erosion of four 
employment practices: i) wage determination on the basis of seniority, age or preferentialism, 2) 
firm-specific training by the employer, 3) internal promotion and lifetime/long-term 
employment, and 4) organizational provision of security/welfare for their employees (Dore, 
1989). We focus on the erosion of these specific practices because they continue to subsist in our 
country of study, Pakistan, but are likely to differ from American MNCs’ more performance-
oriented approach. This offers a unique context of institutional incompatibilities against which to 
study actor-negotiated interplay of deinstitutionalization pressures. Our intention, in studying the 
erosion of these specific employment practices, is not to theorize the delegitimizing effects of 
organizational and contextual factors (Guest & Conway, 2002) on the employment relationship 
per se (Bosch, 2006; Dickens, 2003; Deakin, 2002). Instead, we examine changes in these 
practices as the empirical backdrop for highlighting individual, practical agency in reconciling 
insider and outsider pressures, as well as conflicting institutional prescriptions, in order to 
contribute to the theories of deinstitutionalization. The following section begins with a critique of 
the institutional work literature with a focus on the degree, and type, of agency that is exerted 
during the deinstitutionalization of existing practices. Given the empirical context of this paper 
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we will also consider existing literature on the role of agency in institutionally complex/pluralist 
settings. 
 
Institutional Work 
A key criticism of institutional theory is an overriding emphasis on ‘macrodynamics’ and 
organizational institutionalism that underplays the role and experience of individual actors 
(Lawrence et al, 2011: 52). Recent scholarship on institutional work moves beyond this 
‘mindless institutional reproduction’ (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013: 1281) and offers a more 
refined understanding of agency as interest-driven, planned and strategic (Beckert, 1999); 
whereby social skills and political action can be used by actors to affect stability/instability 
within organizations (Fligstein, 1997). Thus, agency is conceptualized as actors’ ability to 
construct, maintain and deconstruct institutional arrangements (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013) by 
playing a proactive or even reflective  rather than conforming role with respect to both 
institutional change and institutional maintenance (Lawrence et al, 2011; Delbridge & Edwards, 
2008). This allows a more nuanced appreciation of ‘social construction, and power and politics’ 
(Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008: 997 & 1003) when studying actors’ reconciliation of 
deinstitutionalization pressures. 
 
Our paper builds on this institutional work stream to generate a deeper conceptual understanding 
of the interplay of insider and outsider deinstitutionalization pressures in three ways. First, we 
consider actors’ desire to respond to processes of institutional erosion based on agentic 
preference for organizational entropy versus organizational inertia/resistance (Zucker, 1988; 
Oliver, 1992) and subsequent behaviours ranging from active resistance to passive acceptance 
(Oliver, 1991). The notion of embedded agency emphasized in institutional work (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2011) enables a deeper appreciation of the impact 
of differential actor preferences on ‘the processes of de- and re-institutionalization’ (Delbridge & 
Edwards, 2002: 52). Therefore, actors’ desire for consistency versus change will determine their 
participation as institutional entrepreneurs, opposers, consumers of change or opportunity 
creators (ibid) during the deinstitutionalization process. Our paper aims to differentiate between 
these distinctive actor preferences for deinstitutionalization. Therefore, actors who prefer 
consistency and low uncertainty (Oliver, 1992) may deliberately play off contradictory insider 
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and outsider pressures against each other to stem the nature and pace of deinstitutionalization and 
shield themselves/others from the effects of institutional erosion. On the other hand, institutional 
entrepreneurs and consumers of change, who are the internal ‘market’ for change (and 
innovation) (Delbridge & Edwards, 2002), may deploy a range of individual, organizational and 
societal resources to proactively and strategically influence the interplay of insider and outsider 
deinstitutionalization pressures to their advantage. 
 
Second, we highlight actors’ ability to respond to deinstitutionalization dependent on the relative 
strength of a) insider pressures and corresponding field opinion and b) outsider pressures and 
public opinion as well as c) internal patterns of ‘organizational power, authority and political 
influence’ (Oliver, 1992: 583). Insider pressures such as organizational peers’ degree of 
engagement with change can result in a dominant/majority opinion within the institutional field – 
with associated ‘threats and benefits of compliance or noncompliance’ (Clemente & Roulet, 
2015: 99). Subsequently, individual actors’ ability to orchestrate the interplay of insider and 
outsider pressures may be affected by field approval or disapproval surrounding the 
deinstitutionalization process. Similarly, outsider pressures (such as normative values and 
cognitive expectations) can introduce the discursive effects of public opinion either for or against 
deinstitutionalization within the organization. Therefore, if outsider pressures are strong, value-
laden, or historically entrenched, the threat of social approval or disapproval can impact how 
actors negotiate the interplay of insider and outsider deinstitutionalization pressures. Moreover, 
the political influence of actors, and organizational ‘fractions (that) constitute the dominant 
power bloc’ (Burawoy, 1979: 250), will also determine actor ability to respond to practice 
deinstitutionalization. Actors with greater ‘legitimacy, power, competence or bargaining skills’ 
(Oliver, 1992: 583), or individuals acting in an official, organizational capacity (Zucker, 1977), 
should not only experience greater latitude in their manipulation of the interplay of key 
pressures, but should also be better able to mobilize support for their individual interpretation 
and implementation of the deinstitutionalization process.    
 
Third, we explore actors’ type of response to deinstitutionalization when balancing a range of 
insider and outsider pressures. Our paper explores how actors engage in different forms of 
institutional work in response to deinstitutionalization pressures thereby affecting change in 
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existing institutions, the very process of erosion, as well as deinstitutionalization outcomes. For 
this consideration of actor responses, we draw on Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) multi-
dimensional approach to agency, which allows us to capture a range of individual responses to 
deinstitutionalization from active resistance, reproduction and transformation to passive 
engagement. Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) dimension of iterative agency is underlined by a 
past orientation and involves ‘selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and 
action’ (p. 975). The practical-evaluative dimension has a present orientation and involves actor 
responses to a changing set of current exigencies (ibid, 994). Finally, the projective dimension 
has a future orientation signifying engagement with, and negotiation of, the future (ibid, 984). 
Our paper considers a range of agentic responses to deinstitutionalization and recognizes actors 
as aware and purposeful rather than acting as ‘institutional automatons’ (Battilana & D’Aunno, 
2009: 47) in response to calls for ‘a broader vision of agency’ (Lawrence et al, 2009: 1) in 
institutional work. Given our focus on deinstitutionalization, actors can perceive practice erosion 
resulting from performance crises as a present-oriented contingency and therefore display 
practical-evaluative agency when reconciling these insider pressures with outsider normative and 
regulatory pressures. ‘Changing power distributions’ within the organization (Oliver, 1992: 570), 
such as an international merger/acquisition or the chain of command/control shifting from the 
global to the regional headquarters (HQ), and subsequent practice deinstitutionalization, may 
require a more projective form of agency in negotiating the interplay of insider and outsider 
pressures. Furthermore, societal pressures of historical continuity and embedded social values 
can elicit iterative actor responses to interacting insider and outsider pressures. 
 
Institutional Work in a Context of Institutional Complexity 
Extant work on institutional complexity highlights the co-existence of multiple and divergent 
institutional demands, expectations or logics, often with an emphasis on incompatibility 
(Greenwood et al, 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2008). Actor reconciliation of 
this ‘jurisdictional overlap’ between contradictory institutional logics (Thornton et al, 2012: 57) 
can in turn result in conflict (Dunn & Jones, 2010) as well as problem solving and negotiation 
(McPherson & Sauder, 2013). However, a key shortcoming of existing work on institutional 
complexity is its predominantly ‘downward’ approach to agency (Delbridge & Edwards, 2013), 
signifying an emphasis on organizational responses to conflicting environmental demands 
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(Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014). Therefore, institutional demands are often treated as ‘extra-
individual’ (McPherson & Sauder, 2013) and actors as ‘unreflexive carriers of institutions’ 
(Delbridge & Edwards, 2013: 2). This results in a limited understanding of how actors convert 
‘plural social orders’ (ibid – emphasis added) and competing institutional demands into a range 
of human actions such as reproduction or innovation/transformation (Thornton et al, 2012). 
Furthermore, we have little empirical understanding of how agentic actors reconcile divergent 
institutional demands and logics at multiple levels of analysis i.e. actor responses to the 
interaction of institutionally complex insider and outsider pressures.  
 
With respect to insider pressures MNC subsidiaries offer a compelling context in which to study 
institutional complexity because social legitimacy requires the navigation of competing 
global/corporate culture, home country and host country logics (Edwards et al, 2015; Ferner, 
Quintanilla & Varul, 2001). MNC responses to these multiple institutional orders can result in 
adaptation, institutional innovation, or even resistance (Edman, 2016; Regner & Edman, 2014; 
Meyer et al, 2011; Meardi et al, 2009). Therefore, insider pressures on deinstitutionalization are 
particularly complex in the foreign subsidiary context and further complicated depending on 
institutional distance (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 2002) and the degree of 
‘foreignness’ i.e. ‘home-host country dissimilarities’ (Zaheer, 1995; Edman, 2016: 58). This has 
two key implications for our paper. First, institutional complexity and contradictory pressures at 
the subsidiary level may result in partial change and/or adaptation signalling an incomplete 
process of deinstitutionalization. Second, the range of dynamic and constantly evolving insider 
pressures acting on MNCs (Crouch, 2005) signal a context in which institutional complexity is 
experienced as permanent rather than transitory (Zilber, 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008). This in 
turn can result in significant intra-organizational variations in subsidiary actors’ reconciliation of 
insider and outsider pressures on practice deinstitutionalization. 
 
In terms of outsider pressures, comparative institutional literature highlights nationally 
distinctive institutional arrangements (Amable, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1992 & 
1999) because of differential ‘historical, cultural and institutional processes’ and systems (Rees 
& Edwards, 2011: 40). Therefore, country-specific variations in institutional complexity can be 
expected at the societal level of analysis. Our key contention is that the predominant 
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Northern/Western view of institutions as stable, interconnected, and immobile (Regnér & 
Edman, 2014), as well as extant studies on outsider-driven deinstitutionalization in relatively 
stable business systems such as Japan (Ahmadijian & Robinson, 2001) and the U.S. (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009), have limited applicability for rapidly changing developing economies like 
Pakistan. Much of the ‘Global South’ (Alcadipani et.al, 2012) has experienced systemic societal 
change and replacement of institutions because of the coexistence of poverty and income 
inequality, escalating geopolitical conflict and social unrest, and increasing environmental 
vulnerability (Arnold, 2014) alongside globalization, increased FDI inflows, influx of foreign 
MNCs, the rise of third world multinationals, and integration into the global financial system 
(Soederberg, 2004; Khanna & Palepu, 2006; Wells, 1983). This sustained and often oppugnant 
societal change has implications for institutional complexity on two counts. First, systemic 
environmental instability results in high ambiguity and uncertainty and provides actors ‘greater 
room for manoeuvrability and action’ (Regnér & Edman, 2014: 278) when exploiting 
institutional contradictions (Creed et al, 2010). Second, rapid and contradictory change at the 
macro-societal level can result in dynamic outsider pressures. More work is needed on how 
agentic actors unravel this ‘contradiction and interdependence’ of institutions (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991: 241) and the subsequent implications for the interplay of insider and outsider 
deinstitutionalization pressures. 
 
In conclusion, we study deinstitutionalization with the specific aim of capturing cross-level 
interaction between insider and outsider pressures from the perspective of agentic actors. 
Furthermore, we do so against a backdrop of high institutional complexity that requires actor 
manipulation and reconciliation of competing demands at the societal and organizational levels 
of analysis. This allows a more expansive exploration of agency and institutional work. 
Specifically, we explore the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: How, and to what extent, can actors negotiate the interplay of insider and outsider 
pressures on the deinstitutionalization process? 
RQ2: Can actor negotiation of this interplay of insider and outsider pressures lead to differential 
patterns of deinstitutionalization?  
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The following section outlines the methodological rationale, the research process undertaken, the 
organizational context of the three case study subsidiaries under consideration as well as a brief 
overview of the socio-institutional context of Pakistan. 
 
Methodology  
Given the research objectives of studying actor reconciliation of insider and outsider pressures 
on practice deinstitutionalization, an interpretivist approach was adopted to draw out the 
socially-constructed (Husserl, 1965) ‘subjective realities’(McKenna et al, 2011: 150) of a range 
of agentic actors. The emphasis was on studying the bottom-up effects (Hitt et al, 2007), i.e. how 
actors interpreted and reconciled the interplay of insider and outsider influences. Furthermore, 
the interpretive paradigm helps capture the uniqueness and contextual depth (Myers, 1997) of the 
institutionally complex milieu of MNC subsidiaries operating in an under-explored context like 
Pakistan. A comparative, multi-case approach was adopted in line with recent calls for 
qualitative international business research (Birkinshaw et al, 2011). Three American subsidiaries 
were drawn from banking (BankCo), agro-chemical (ChemicalCo) and retail (BeverageCo) 
sectors. Although all three were American, differences in home country effects could be 
expected given significant variations in subsidiary size, age, product markets, and competitive 
pressures (see table 1).Case selection emphasized theoretical significance rather than statistical 
representativeness (Meardi et al, 2009) and two key criteria were applied: subsidiaries should be 
successfully operating in Pakistan so that business failure would not obfuscate the 
deinstitutionalization process and access to the Pakistani head office was possible so that the 
research could tap into a large pool of subsidiary actors fulfilling the sample criteria (outlined 
below). 
(insert tables 1 & 2 here) 
 
A total of 63 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted (see table 2). Eleven 
interviews with senior subsidiary management (lasting 60-90 minutes) provided information on 
the organisational context. These interviewees were specifically chosen for their knowledge of 
both subsidiary- level strategy, policies and practices as well as the international orientations and 
global strategy of the MNC.  
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An additional 52 workers1 were interviewed (for 45-60 minutes each) to capture a range of actors 
experiencing deinstitutionalization. Respondents had at least degree-level qualification or above, 
permanent employment status, and came from across different hierarchical levels (ranging from 
graduate recruits to director level employees) and functions (such as HR, sales and marketing, 
manufacturing, IT, accounting etc.). Given the theoretical lens of institutional work it was 
important to have a large enough sample that would highlight 1) dominant versus low-power 
actors with differential political influence and opinion-forming/conforming behaviours 
(Clemente & Roulet, 2015) (see last row of table 1), 2) in-group relations and the possibility of 
collective institutional work2 (Lawrence et al, 2011), and 3) potential differences in actor agency 
and responses when reconciling interacting insider and outsider deinstitutionalization pressures. 
Participants were interviewed at their place of work (with the exception of ChemicalCo regional 
managers who were dispersed across the country, necessitating telephone interviews). All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed (including translation where necessary). Analysis was 
conducted using a ‘combined technique of inductive and deductive thematic analysis’ (Fereday 
& Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 81) whereby a dual approach was adopted for coding and interpreting 
textual data. Table 3 sets out the key stages undertaken during the analytical process and the 
methodological rationale for each stage. 
(insert table 3 here) 
 
Pakistan – the socio-institutional context 
A structural institutionalist analysis of Pakistan highlights it as an institutionally complex context 
exhibiting features from several varieties of capitalism or business systems with subsequent 
implications for the four practices under consideration. An insider model of corporate 
governance dominated by owner-managers, typical of the personalized business system of the 
Philippines and Thailand (Walter & Zhang, 2012), combined with fragmented and weak union 
organization and low collective bargaining, is visible in Pakistan’s lightly regulated labour 
                                                                 
1 Since this paper is studying deinstitutionalization with respect to employment practices, the employment relations 
distinction of ‘management’ and ‘workers’ is adopted to differentiate between actors with strategic, subsidiary -level 
managerial responsibilities and those without.  
2 In this paper collective institutional work is conceptualized as in-group relations and collective notions of loyalty 
and cohesion (House et al, 2004) rather than traditional union representation since professional and managerial staff 
in Pakistan are prevented from unionizing because of labour law and thereby not covered by collective agreements 
(Hisam, 2014; Ghayur, 2009; UNI, 2008). 
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market with minimal state intervention (for example, no systematic enforcement of minimum 
wages, working hours, dismissal protection or union representation of managers/professionals) 
(Ghayur, 2009). One can also trace the dualistic characteristics of the state-led systems of China 
and Malaysia (Walter & Zhang, 2012) (namely long-term employment, training and welfare 
provision in the public sector) in Pakistani public sector organizations’ continued emphasis on 
dependence and ‘long-term mutual obligations’ (Eldridge & Mahmood, 1993). Furthermore, key 
drivers of change such as ‘deregulation, increased globalization, and economic hardship’ (Khilji, 
2003b: 142) have led to an increasingly ‘arms-length’ approach by the Pakistani state typical of 
liberal market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001), and created even greater variation in 
organizational practices. Therefore, younger, highly skilled employees, exposed to Western 
education and management ideals increasingly favour more individualistic employment practices 
(Khilji, 2001). However, there is also continued persistence of more collectivist, socially 
sanctioned, traditional values learned through early socialization (Khilji, 2003b) persisting 
alongside these more modern, ‘Western’ notions of management (Khilji, 2003a, b, 2002).  
(insert figure 1 here) 
 
This duality in societal values and norms has specific implications for the practices under 
consideration in this paper (see figure 1). For instance, with respect to wages there is continued 
evidence of employee benefits being tied to family welfare, reward being rated lower than 
normative values like respect and authority, and high salary differentials within organizations 
alongside growing acceptability of performance-based financial rewards in other segments of the 
labour market (Khilji, 2003 a & b). Similarly, in some organizations internal promotion is still 
closely tied to factors like age, length of service, and personal bias (based on regional, religious 
and caste affiliations) while in others there has been a shift towards external employability and 
individual responsibility for career development (Author a, 2013). This specific combination of 
sometimes contradictory practices can be attributed to the particular evolutionary path taken by 
Pakistan, which has subsumed processes of both radical as well as gradual institutional change 
(Walter & Zhang, 2012; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). More importantly, 
this duality in the implementation and experience of specific practices offers a unique context in 
which to study deinstitutionalization because high institutional complexity inherent in the 
outsider pressures will in turn have an impact on the interplay of insider and outsider pressures. 
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Findings 
Given our actor-oriented approach, we consider the interaction of insider and outsider pressures, 
and the subsequent impact, on deinstitutionalization with respect to four key employment 
practices: 1) wages, 2) training, 3) internal promotion, and 4) job security/organizational 
provision of welfare. In line with our over-arching aim of studying individual, practical agency 
we highlight both key insider and outsider pressures as well as differential actor responses to the 
interaction of these pressures.  
 
Wages 
All three subsidiaries exhibited a strong ethos of individualized, competitive, and differentiated 
wages signalling deinstitutionalization of preferential and seniority-based reward practices in 
favour of a performance-oriented approach. Subsidiary actors appreciated performance-based 
wage differentials because it emphasised transparency and meritocracy - ‘wage growth… here 
(is) purely based on performance’ (FC-E-2) and ‘… if you are performing… if you deserve it 
you don’t even have to ask for it...’ (CB-E-11). This signaled a predominant actor response of 
compliance with practice deinstitutionalization as opposed to favouring socially sanctioned 
factors such as age, seniority, nepotism etc..As a BeverageCo employee highlighted: 
‘(Wages are)…based on individual performance and yearly reviews and organizational 
performance. I would say it is pretty clear cut and there is not much subjectivity 
associated with it…’ (CC-E-7) 
 
Headquarter (HQ) control over subsidiary wage bills and high performance pressures on 
compensation exerted strong insider pressures on the erosion of alternative patterns of wage 
allocation subsisting in Pakistan. ChemicalCo’s HR Director (Asia-Pacific region) argued: 
‘…the basic business philosophy… is… you pay for performance… and that again is a 
global(ly) driven thing’. (FC-M-1) 
 
Additionally, dominant workgroups (i.e. high-potential actors with a significant impact on 
subsidiary performance) predictably enjoyed the highest wage growth. For example, a high-
potential manager at BeverageCo (who had been poached from a competitor firm) highlighted 
that‘(compared to) when I joined… the salary I’m earning now is about 3 times more… which is 
simply phenomenal over a 6 year period’ (CC-E-1) while a low-power actor in the same 
department had exactly the opposite experience - ‘(wage growth) in this company it is slightly on 
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the lower side but then that is the constraint with (my) department’ (CC-E-11). 
 
An interesting actor response of supplementation emerged that reflected enduring socio-
institutional legacy effects – i.e. allocating some reward on the basis of care, taking into account 
employees’ personal circumstances, and the importance of preserving dignity/reputation through 
reward mechanisms alongside the dominant rhetoric of performance-based wages. A Chemical 
Co respondent highlighted that: 
‘The (manager) does have discretionary powers… for example if he feels that this 
employee … some year for some reason he has had problems and he wasn’t able to 
perform… sometimes they accommodate that person…’ (FC-E-4) 
 
This supplementation response of competitive and performance based wages subsisting 
alongside socially approved variables such as seniority, rank, status markers and class symbols in 
Pakistan was also evident in the flexible allocation of employee benefits - beyond the dominant, 
centrally controlled, and performance-oriented approach to compensation. Therefore, a gradation 
system ‘dependent on your rank’ within the organizational hierarchy was applied when 
allocating benefits. Additionally, a far more extensive range of employee benefits (including 
cars, computers, phones, medical and health insurance, life insurance, provident fund, gratuity 
fund, preferential loans/mortgages etc.), far higher than in comparable national firms, were 
offered so that ‘perks’ matched ‘your status in the company’ (CC-M-1).  
 
Training 
Consideration of training practices highlighted an incomplete process of deinstitutionalization. 
Instead of lower skilling and devolving learning to the employee, training continued to be 
regarded as a key organizational responsibility. This can be attributed to insider-pressures 
exerted by HQ-mandated goals such as subsidiary profitability, talent identification and market 
expansion/new business creation, which required constant up-skilling and therefore acted against 
anticipated practice deinstitutionalization. For instance, the Corporate Banking Head for BankCo 
Pakistan observed: 
‘(training is) intensive and… because if you are (operating) in so many countries you 
need to have a certain degree of formalized level of training… the policies and 
procedures are a lot more elaborate so you need to be trained in… how those specific 
policies and procedures apply…’ (CB-M-1) 
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There was also a continued focus on firm-specific as opposed to general training at the 
subsidiary level, emphasizing ‘exposure to (organizational) best practices’, ‘training was focused 
more on what was the need of the business locally’ and ‘training (that) goes with the strategy’. A 
key actor response (especially for those with managerial responsibilities) was one of 
supplementation whereby the already extensive developmental activities offered by the 
organization were augmented ‘boss-driven’, ‘on-the-job training’, ‘mentoring and coaching’ and 
‘soft skills development’ (CB-M-1). This focus on personal tutelage, over an impersonal and 
formal employer-employee relationship, reflected lingering outsider socio-cultural influences on 
paternalistic leadership attitudes and strong in-group affiliations.  
 
However, training expenditure was disproportionately concentrated on actors who were seen to 
offer a higher return on organizational investment. These dominant actors therefore benefitted 
not just from more training but also more diverse learning/developmental opportunities. 
Crucially they also enjoyed more autonomy in choosing their training courses and therefore, 
were more likely to emphasize the creation of ‘general skills that apply to almost any other 
organization’, and how learning was ‘transferrable’ and led to ‘overall development’ (CC-E-9). 
In contrast, low-power actors were offered far less training with lower transferability across the 
external labour market: 
‘…most of the trainings BankCo provides to front end staff… I’m back end staff… (the) 
bank’s main concern is to make money so that’s why they spend a lot of money on front 
end staff… they don’t provide a lot of training to back end staff… only basic training, 
once in a year…’ (CB-E-7)  
 
These intra-organizational differentials had resulted in an entrepreneurial response of 
syncretization whereby low-power actors proactively developed diverse/atypical in-group 
relationships to improve access to learning opportunities and increase their own employability 
akin to their dominant counterparts. This involved not just relationship-building with a ‘mentor 
at work’ (CC-E-5) but also extensive social interaction and networking with distant 
organizational members (i.e. in other cities and even countries) in order to capitalise on ‘lateral 
learning’. Proactive networking for learning purposes emerged as a common practice (even in 
the case of Bank Co where formal communication with other branches was quite limited) and 
served as a key response for those low-power actors ‘left to their own resources’ because their 
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‘training (was) not appreciated or well developed’ by their employing organization.  
 
Internal promotion 
There was strong corporate HQ control over headcount in all three MNCs and significant home 
country pressure to promote on the basis of performance, as opposed to persisting institutional 
preference for tenures, seniority or contacts. Moreover, all three subsidiaries had very lean 
organizational structures symptomatic of American MNCs which necessitated this performance-
based approach to promotion. Actors across all three MNCs exhibited a keen awareness of how 
performance-mediated internal promotion more so in foreign organizations as compared to 
socio-institutional norms prevalent in local firms. An HR employee at ChemicalCo stated that: 
‘If I am not performing well after 2-3 months, maximum 5 months, management will say 
either you perform or you leave… it’s like that everywhere but I think it’s less (so) in 
national companies’. (FC-E-13)  
 
However, there was only partial compliance with deinstitutionalization to completely 
competitive promotion practices because of the impact of countervailing insider and outsider 
pressures. First, there was an outsider-driven necessity to maintain stable internal labour market 
conditions and retain and promote existing staff given a small and competitive labour market for 
managers/professionals, which encouraged ‘a lot of movement’, ‘going around in full circles’ 
and moving to ‘bigger and better roles’ (CB-M-1). Second, ChemicalCo and BeverageCo in 
particular were also under strong insider pressure from the HQ to develop talent pipelines of 
potential expatriates for deployment to other regional/international operations. For example, 
ChemicalCo held regional ‘leadership development reviews’ where ‘we used to talk about the 
talent… so even the chairman would know who the top 20 per cent was…’ (FC-M-1). The 
interaction of these conflicting insider and outsider pressures at the organizational level of 
analysis diluted the deinstitutionalization process and even created some room for tenure- and 
seniority-based promotion with respect to individual actors. Subsidiaries could ill-afford the 
effects of job-hopping and attrition and this meant explicitly favouring internal candidates for 
‘senior level opening(s)’ in order to ‘show people that they have careers… and serious 
opportunities’ (CB-M-1). 
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However, actor awareness of these insider pressures (to retain talent) alongside outsider 
pressures (of a highly competitive external labour market) led to the unexpected outcome of 
actors proactively taking individual responsibility for ‘career growth and career development’. 
This supplementation response married expectations of rapid, meritocratic promotion whereby 
they ‘skipped a few levels’ (FC-E-1) with capitalizing on market opportunities if internal growth 
opportunities ‘failed to impress’ or did not signal an ‘increase in responsibilities’, and actively 
monitoring available jobs in the external market whether they intended inter-organizational 
moves or not. This was an unexpected actor response because the interplay of conflicting insider 
and outsider pressures had stymied the deinstitutionalization of promotion practices, which 
actors could have strategically exploited to resist performance-based promotion. Instead, actors 
relied on a supplementation response of relying on higher general employability because they 
knew that they were highly ‘marketable’ and ‘competitor companies are on the lookout to poach’ 
(FC-E-12) given their work experience and training in a well-known foreign firm with a ‘brand 
name’ (CB-E-2).  
 
Job security & provision of welfare 
There was an emphasis on a performance-oriented organizational culture and externalization of 
job security and welfare onto the employee across all three MNCs. Actors confirmed this 
deinstitutionalization of lifetime employment by expressing opinions like the ‘phenomenon of 
job security I feel no longer exists’ and ‘that fear is always there… in our minds’. This 
internalization of insecurity, and personal responsibility for their continued employment based 
on individual performance, was seen as a natural trade-off given that they enjoyed meritocratic 
growth and higher monetary benefits compared to national organizations.  
 
A second key finding was the differential pace of deinstitutionalization with respect to this 
particular practice across the three subsidiaries. BankCo offered the lowest job security, 
primarily because of the streamlining of the Pakistani operations in response to the global 
financial crisis. Job security in ChemicalCo was also rated as relatively low because a recent 
internal restructuring had led to a significantly leaner structure and a stronger performance-
oriented culture. In comparison, BeverageCo offered relatively high job security (although never 
at the cost of poor performance) and the regional HQ had explicitly issued reassurances on job 
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security in order to avoid panic and subsequent attrition since their ‘restructuring took place 
immediately after the financial crisis started’ and ‘people were doubly worried’ about layoffs 
(CC-M-1). These intra-organizational differentials in turn had a direct impact on the strength of 
the insider pressure exerted on the deinstitutionalization process. 
 
An actor-centred approach to this practice highlighted several micro-level responses. A key 
response was syncretization whereby actors reconciled higher insecurity by evoking notions of 
their ‘elite’ status in the external labour market as well as their ability to utilise both their 
employability and personal contacts to secure alternative employment. A BeverageCo employee 
highlighted that: 
‘… because the pool of professionals is limited… particularly those who have rich and 
relevant experience. So (that’s) a bargaining position for each one of us’. (CC-E-1) 
 
A second actor response, specifically displayed by actors with managerial responsibilities, was 
resistance. Job insecurity, and any subsequent job losses, were actively resisted by deploying 
personal and organizational resources to buffer employees from deinstitutionalization pressures 
on this practice. Subsidiary actors recognised this response to be at odds with the performance-
oriented corporate ethos but nevertheless engaged in it because unchecked deinstitutionalization 
signalled a complete fracture of personal, in-group ties (underscored with socially sanctioned 
values of protection, support and respect). For instance, the Corporate Banking Head for BankCo 
Pakistan highlighted that: 
‘…that’s where you have huge geographic discordance… … in Hong Kong, Tokyo, 
London, New York… nobody gives a s***… … (but) there is no social security, no 
unemployment benefits whatsoever in Pakistan… so here firing is a big deal… but that’s 
all informal, personal based… I know many cases when we didn’t need someone and that 
position was possibly going to be eliminated and if that guy was probably in Tokyo or 
London or New York nobody would have really cared… (but) people here would 
protect… it’s nothing to do with policy and process… it’s a personal and cultural thing 
nothing else’. (CB-M-1) 
 
(insert table 4 here) 
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Discussion 
Our paper sought to answer two key research questions: How, and to what extent, can actors 
negotiate the interplay of insider and outsider pressures on the deinstitutionalization process? 
and Can this interplay of insider and outsider pressures lead to differential patterns of 
deinstitutionalization? Table 4 summarizes the range of often contradictory organizational and 
socio-institutional pressures acting on four key organizational practices undergoing 
deinstitutionalization; as well as different organizational actors’ distinctive reconciliation of 
these interacting pressures. Based on our findings we theorize that the interplay of these insider 
and outsider pressures is differentially mediated by micro-political actors, with significant 
differences in the desire, ability and type of responses between actors with strategic, subsidiary-
level responsibilities and those without (see table 4). More importantly, we highlight that the 
interplay of insider and outsider pressures results in three distinct yet co-existing phases of 
deinstitutionalization: i) complete deinstitutionalization, ii) partial deinstitutionalization and iii) 
negotiated deinstitutionalization (see table 4). We contribute to the deinstitutionalization 
literature by applying the institutional work lens to define these different phases through the 
underlying individual- level enabling conditions for each phase. 
 
Complete deinstitutionalization 
Competitive, differentiated, and performance-based wages was the only employment practice 
that had undergone a complete process of deinstitutionalization (see table 4). This complete 
deinstitutionalization was possible because of three key individual-level enabling conditions, 
which resulted in the compatible interplay of insider and outsider pressures. First, actors 
exhibited explicit appreciation of the external socio-institutional complexity. They were aware of 
the logic of performance-based financial rewards subsisting in certain pockets of the external 
labour market (primarily other foreign MNCs) alongside the logic of socially approved, 
preferential, and seniority-based compensation. However, it was not in their individual self-
interest to manipulate these countervailing logics and strategically manage (even possibly stem) 
the process of deinstitutionalization. Instead, they acted as consumers of change (Delbridge & 
Edwards, 2002) by engaging in supplementation and compliance in order to benefit from merit-
based rewards (see table 4). Second and related to the first condition, the interaction of insider 
and outsider pressures for this practice did not generate institutional instability that needed 
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proactive/strategic actor management (Fligstein, 1997; Beckert, 1999) and therefore 
deinstitutionalization was endorsed by all subsidiary actors (signified by the two-way arrow in 
table 4). Third, lower institutional incompatibilities (Jepperson, 1991) between insider and 
outsider pressures resulted in lower reflexivity with respect to actor negotiation of 
deinstitutionalization. Therefore, subsidiary management exercised iterative agency by simply 
‘reproducing’ persisting social norms such as status markers and supplementing performance-
driven wages with extensive employee benefits (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Subsidiary 
workers exercised practical-evaluative agency by making ‘practical and normative judgments’ 
(Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009: 47) about the efficacy of having a strictly meritocratic rather than 
preferential approach to compensation. Crucially, both actor responses, and underlying forms of 
agency, for this phase of deinstitutionalization did not signify strategic institutional work. 
 
Partial deinstitutionalization 
Two employment practices (training and internal promotion) signaled partial erosion (signified 
by the dashed arrow - see table 4). This phase of deinstitutionalization also had distinct 
individual- level enabling conditions that influenced the interplay of insider and outsider 
pressures. First, it was a unidirectional process driven by a group of institutional entrepreneurs 
(Garud et al, 2007; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) who saw ‘an opportunity to realize interests 
that they value highly’ (DiMaggio, 1988: 14). Equally important was the lack of a counteracting 
response from other actors (i.e. actors with strategic, subsidiary- level responsibilities) who 
instead acted as consumers of change (Delbridge & Edwards, 2002). Second, it highlighted that 
actors can halt deinstitutionalization by manipulating the dynamic interplay of insider and 
outsider influences. For example, from the perspective of managerial actors, immediate 
subsidiary goals of profitability and expansion (i.e. insider pressures) as well as personal 
responsibility for subordinates’ development (i.e. socio-normative outsider pressures) both 
discouraged deinstitutionalization of firm-specific and employer-funded training (see table 4). 
However, subsidiary workers, instead of adapting to this management- led interruption in the 
deinstitutionalization process, continued to engage in ‘purposive action’ designed for dealing 
with institutional disruption even when no practice erosion was occurring (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006: 215). The syncretization response (see table 4) signals actors’ strategic appreciation of the 
institutional environment they are embedded in (for example, taking advantage of their enhanced 
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employability in the external labour market) and high actor reflexivity even when insider and 
outsider pressures are not necessarily incompatible so that they were equipped to deal with any 
future field-level jolts (Greenwood et al, 2002). Third, actors without managerial responsibilities 
who were driving this phase of partial deinstitutionalization primarily displayed projective 
agency, signifying an ‘imaginative engagement with the future’ (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998: 
984) and therefore, capitalizing on transferrable skills and high employability status with respect 
to future employment opportunities.  
 
An additional point of interest that emerged from this phase of partial deinstitutionalization was 
the simultaneous display of multiple types of agency by the same actors. For instance, 
managerial actors engaged in iterative agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) when supplementing 
organizational training opportunities with extensive, personal, on-the-job development of their 
subordinates in line with established social norms of paternalistic attitudes (see table 4). 
However, there was also an underlying layer of practical-evaluative agency (ibid) whereby well-
trained, high-performing teams helped achieve HQ-determined goals and current exigencies at 
the subsidiary level of analysis. This finding not only responds to the emphasis in institutional 
work literature on engaging with a ‘broader vision of agency’ (Lawrence et al, 2009:1) but more 
importantly underlines agency as an evolving and multi-dimensional concept (Battilana & 
D’Aunno, 2009) whereby actor engagement with the social world is underpinned by a range of 
simultaneously occurring behaviours. 
 
Negotiated deinstitutionalization 
Job security, and underlying notions of organizational welfare, underwent negotiated 
deinstitutionalization (signified by a two-way arrow – see table 4). The interplay of insider and 
outsider pressures highlighted specific individual- level enabling conditions for this phase of 
deinstitutionalization. First, distinctive agentic responses led to a negotiated middle ground. 
Actors with managerial responsibilities displayed iterative agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) 
i.e. the recursive, habitual response of protecting in-group members from insider-driven 
exigencies. However, subsidiary workers primarily exhibited projective agency (ibid) of 
responding to increased job insecurity by evoking alternative employment opportunities. This 
concurrent actor emphasis on the past and the future led to an intermediate state of negotiated 
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practice deinstitutionalization i.e. lower job security alongside a layer of personal and informal 
protections. Second, negotiated deinstitutionalization emerged when institutionally incompatible 
insider and outsider pressures interacted (that is, high employment uncertainty versus strong 
social ties promising mutual support, loyalty, and protection). Against this context of outsider 
pressures that were likely to generate strong social disapproval, and subsequent field instability, 
actors engaged in active negotiation of the deinstitutionalization process itself. Third, this 
negotiation by actors did not lead to the creation of a new institutional order (Jarzabkowski et al, 
2009) or signify a complete reversal of the deinstitutionalization process, resulting in the 
reinstitutionalization of this practice. Instead, the interplay of conflicting insider and outsider 
pressures allowed actors to actively, and strategically, respond to institutional complexity and 
pluralism without necessarily engaging in replacement-based institutional work. 
 
Conclusion 
Our main objective was to extend the seminal theoretical and empirical work on 
deinstitutionalization (Oliver, 1992; Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; 
Clemente & Roulet, 2015) by undertaking an empirical, micro-institutional examination of the 
interplay of insider and outsider pressures on practice deinstitutionalization. We built on 
institutional work scholarship to study this actor-negotiated interplay of different pressures 
against a backdrop of institutional plurality and complexity.  
 
Our focus on the interplay of insider and outsider pressures contributes to extant scholarship by 
highlighting convergent yet co-existing phases of deinstitutionalization. Existing work on the 
erosion of organizational practices has already highlighted different stages of 
deinstitutionalization such as the complete abandonment of practices (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; 
Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Greve, 1995) versus partial deinstitutionalization (Tolbert & Sine, 
1999). However, much of this organizational institutionalism focuses on the field level of 
analysis and has an underlying assumption of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ - that is, periods of 
stability, or processes aimed at achieving stability, with only temporary intervals of change and 
transition (Delbridge & Edwards, 2008: 304). In contrast, our coexisting phases of 
deinstitutionalization suggest a persistent state of instability. These findings offer a unique 
insight into the deinstitutionalization process. First, our simultaneous consideration of several 
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practices highlighted that insider and outsider pressures interacted in novel ways with respect to 
the erosion of each practice resulting in a differential pace and degree of deinstitutionalization. 
This can be linked to interpretive schemes and shared meaning/understanding varying for each 
practice – whereby culturally embedded, ‘cherished’ practices (such as organizational provision 
of welfare and security) are more likely to be subject to repair and negotiated 
deinstitutionalization whereas less valued practices (such as non-meritorious, seniority-based 
wages) are more likely to be initiate compliance and complete erosion (Oliver, 1992).   
 
Second, our study considered a range of actors exercising differential forms of agency when 
reconciling and manipulating the interplay of insider and outsider pressures. This is in contrast to 
extant institutional scholarship that has tended to focus on institutional entrepreneurs and 
powerful actors thereby presenting a rather ‘simplified view of change’ (Delbridge & Edwards, 
2008: 304) focused on either actors who advocate change or those who resist it (Delbridge & 
Edwards, 2002). Our focus on a multiplicity of agentic micro-processes highlighted a much more 
convoluted picture of change in which several phases of deinstitutionalization coexisted because 
of different actors’ differential ability to deploy a range of socio-institutional, organizational and 
individual resources to negotiate insider and outsider pressures.  
 
Third, we studied deinstitutionalization in a context of high institutional complexity whereby 
insider and outsider pressures both encapsulated contradictory institutional prescriptions. A 
rational assumption would be that in such a highly uncertain environment there would be higher 
organizational and actor demand for ‘security, stability, and predictability’ (Oliver, 1991: 171). 
However, the very instability and fragmented nature of the environment can also impede 
institutional consensus (ibid). This in turn creates room for actors to exercise flexibility, 
pragmatism and creativity when balancing divergent insider and outsider pressures to engage in 
negotiation and consensus-building (McPherson & Sauder, 2013) – subsequently enabling the 
coexistence of different phases of deinstitutionalization. 
 
Taking an actor-centred approach to study the interplay of insider and outsider pressures also 
forces an examination of the discursive effects of nomenclature on theoretical development. The 
term deinstitutionalization by default evokes imagery of destruction, conflict, and resistance and 
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expectations of “heroic” actors (Levy & Sculley, 2007) engaging in disruptive and defensive 
work (Maguire & Hardy, 2009). However, the institutional work literature, with its focus on the 
‘lived experience’ of actors, rejects this traditional fascination with radical, successful change 
(Lawrence et al, 2011) and chooses to deal with the more mundane ‘coalface’ of quotidian life 
(Barley, 2008). Our study also highlighted that resistance was a minority response within an 
array of less grand micro-processes such as compliance, syncretization and supplementation. 
Such work is compelling because it offers a more expansive approach to agency (Lawrence et al, 
2009) by capturing ‘a complex mélange of forms of agency… simultaneously radical and 
conservative, strategic and emotional, full of compromises’ (Lawrence et al, 2011: 52).  
 
However, why did resistance not emerge as a dominant response given our focus on actor 
negotiation of conflicting insider and outsider pressures? First, we know from organizational 
institutionalism literature that highly interconnected and interdependent institutional 
environments induce compromise and avoidance as the dominant responses (Oliver, 1991). By 
extension then, the normative value attached to strong, in-group ties between actors and the 
continued importance of cultural norms like protection, support and respect in our specific socio-
institutional context of Pakistan all signify high inter-dependence and subsequently an emphasis 
on moderation, negotiation and coordination rather than outright resistance. Second, resistance 
cannot be driven single-handedly by individual actors (Maguire & Hardy, 2009) and requires 
significant flexing of ‘organizational power, authority and political influence’ (Oliver, 1992: 
583) to generate a dominant insider opinion (Clemente & Roulet, 2015) capable of transforming 
the ‘non-cooperative reactions of other members of the field’ (Hardy & Maguire, 2008: 210). 
Given strategic manipulation and decision-making by individual actors (as highlighted in our 
discussion), this game plan of outright defiance and internal campaigning would be a very risky 
strategy when similar processes of deinstitutionalization are also unfolding in other segments of 
the external labour market. 
 
Our paper’s emphasis on the interplay of insider and outsider pressures on deinstitutionalization 
also offered some interesting insights in how and why individual actors exert control on this 
process of interaction. The findings highlighted that actors mostly tended to favour internal 
legitimacy (i.e. legitimacy within the MNC) by accepting insider pressures and reconciling them 
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with external constraints primarily through processes of supplementation and compliance. This 
can be tied to a range of existing explanations such as pragmatic pursuit of individual self-
interest (Bitektine, 2011), currying favour with the HQ to further their own careers 
(Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009), and the dominance effects exerted by foreign MNCs in host 
locations (Pudelko & Harzing, 2007). However, in those situations where relational ties were 
threatened, external legitimacy (i.e. within the host environment) (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and 
outsider pressures were given precedence over insider pressures such HQ/corporate approval. 
For example, paternalistic responsibility for protecting subordinates’ jobs was seen as the 
socially ‘right thing to do’ even if it meant going against the efficiency logic and lean 
organizational structures permeated by the HQ. This strategic and planned agency exercised by 
individual actors in playing off insider and outsider pressures for different practices would have 
been completely lost if this study had not undertaken an institutional work approach. Our 
findings represent an interesting counterpoint to some of the extant work on institutional change 
and entrepreneurship (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006): actors can sometimes exhibit high 
embeddedness in their socio-institutional context; for instance, offering status-oriented employee 
benefits despite insider pressures for a merit-based approach to wages. These actor responses 
may have had the unintended consequence of controlling the pace of deinstitutionalization (that 
did not threaten relational and/or moral boundaries) and through gradual practice erosion 
conferring external, socio-normative legitimacy to the deinstitutionalization process.  
 
In conclusion, we acknowledge that our findings and conceptual contribution(s) have emerged 
against a very distinctive context. However, our conceptualization of the enabling conditions of 
the different phases of deinstitutionalization are far more relevant for comparable economies 
from the Global South than the predominantly Western research setting for much of the core 
institutional scholarship. For in many developing and emerging economies outsider pressures 
stemming from a rapidly changing institutional environment interact with insider pressures and 
are likely to lead to a messier, incomplete, and on-going process of deinstitutionalization. It 
would be interesting to replicate our focus on the interplay of insider and outsider pressures, the 
coexistence of different phases of deinstitutionalization, and, the emergence of differential actor 
responses and types of agency across these distinct phases in cross-national studies; especially 
comparative research between Western versus developing/emerging contexts. 
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